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Auckland is the largest city in New Zealand (pop. 1.5 million) and is situated atop an active monogenetic volcanic
field. When volcanic activity next occurs, the most effective means of protecting the people who reside and work
in the region will be to evacuate the danger zone prior to the eruption. This study investigates the evacuation
demand throughout the Auckland Volcanic Field and the capacity of the transportation network to fulfil such a
demand. Diurnal movements of the population are assessed and, due to the seemingly random pattern of
eruptions in the past, a non-specific approach is adopted to determine spatial vulnerabilities at a micro-scale (neigh-
bourhoods). We achieve this through the calculation of population-, household- and car-to-exit capacity ratios. Fol-
lowing an analysis of transportation hub functionality and the susceptibility of motorway bridges to a new eruption,
modelling using dynamic route and traffic assignment was undertaken to determine various evacuation attributes
at a macro-scale and forecast total network clearance times. Evacuation demand was found to be highly correlated
to diurnal population movements and neighbourhood boundary types, a trend that was also evident in the evacu-
ation capacity ratio results. Elevated population to evacuation capacity ratios occur during the day in and around
the central city, and at night in many of the outlying suburbs. Low-mobility populations generally have better than
average access to public transportation. Macro-scale vulnerability was far more contingent upon the destination of
evacuees, with favourable results for evacuation within the region as opposed to outside the region. Clearance
times for intra-regional evacuation ranged from one to nine hours, whereas those for inter-regional evacuation were
found to be so high, that the results were unrealistic. Therefore, we conclude that, from a mobility standpoint, there
is considerable merit to intra-regional evacuation.
Keywords: Emergency management; Geospatial analysis; Transportation modelling; Vulnerability; Hazard; RiskIntroduction
Evacuations are, and most likely will continue to be, the
most common and efficient emergency management
strategy when a hazardous event threatens and puts at
risk the safety of those within the area (Moriarty et al.
2007). Evacuations are also becoming increasingly fre-
quent worldwide as humans continue to develop in
hazardous areas and improved technology in many
countries allows for prior warnings and the movement* Correspondence: j.lindsay@auckland.ac.nz
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2014of people before a disaster strikes (Sparks 2003, Woo
and Grossi 2009). However, evacuations can produce
long-term negative effects such as psychological trauma,
and disruption of community cohesion and employment
and economic continuity (e.g. Mileti et al. 1991, Lindell
and Perry 1992, Cola 1996, Tobin and Whiteford 2002,
Perry and Lindell 2003). Poorly managed evacuations
tend to lead to a strong resentment of government
which, in turn, decreases the ability of emergency man-
agement organisations to act effectively in the future
(MCDEM 2008). Therefore, effective planning of an
evacuation is essential.an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
Figure 1 Map of Auckland (inset shows the location of Auckland, Hamilton and Whangarei within New Zealand), showing volcanic
deposits of the Auckland Volcanic Field (representing present extent), and key infrastructure elements.
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of hazards which are harmful to humans. These hazards
range from highly destructive phenomena such as pyroclas-
tic density currents, debris avalanches, lava flows and lahars
that typically destroy everything in their path, to less de-
structive yet highly disruptive phenomena such as ash fall,
volcanic tremor and gas release. As many volcanoes and
volcanic regions around the world are already heavily popu-
lated, the most effective means of risk reduction will be to
identify the most hazardous areas and evacuate the popula-
tion from the danger zone prior to an eruption (Marzocchi
and Woo 2007, Lindsay et al. 2011, Sandri et al. 2012).
The city of Auckland, New Zealand, with a population of
~1.5 million as of December 2012, is built within the
360 km2 potentially active basaltic Auckland Volcanic Field
(AVF) (Figure 1), with the last eruption occurring just
550 years ago (Needham et al. 2011). Auckland’s geography
poses significant constraints for evacuation planning. The
city is located on an isthmus bounded by the Waitemata
Harbour to the northeast and Manukau Harbour to the
southwest. As a result, all land-based transport into and out
of the city is constricted through narrow stretches of land
serviced by four motorway bridges which form critical links
in Auckland’s transportation network (Figure 1). To date,
there has been no major modelling-based study conducted
on the mass evacuation capacity of Auckland. Previous
evacuation planning has been mainly strategic and lacking
in geospatial analysis and physical evacuation procedures
that can be used operationally (Auckland CDEM Group
2008a, Auckland CDEM Group 2008b, Tomsen 2010).
In this study we adopt a novel, non-specific approach
(Shulman 2008) in considering the spatial and temporal
distribution of population and transport networks across
Auckland and how they affect mass evacuation planning.
Spatial network analysis is used to determine the geo-
graphic functionality of major transport origin and des-
tination points and we determine the relative
vulnerabilities of the key motorway bridges to new AVF
eruptions. We then assess micro-evacuation vulnerability
by combining spatial network analysis with population
evacuation demand to calculate evacuation capacity ra-
tios for individuals, households and vehicles. Finally, we
employ modelling using dynamic route and traffic as-
signment to measure evacuation attributes at a macro-
scale and forecast total network clearance times. This
quantitative study thus serves to fill the informational
void and provides emergency management officials with
a more holistic understanding of the local variations in
susceptibility to mass evacuations, particularly those re-
lated to volcanic activity in the AVF.
Evacuation planning
There is a broad body of literature on effective evacu-
ation planning. Many studies have attempted to classifyevacuations into various types (e.g. Baker 1991, Ketter-
idge et al. 1996, Wolshon et al. 2001, Marrero et al.
2010) and others have focussed on emergency response
activities (e.g. Cova 1999, Cutter 2003, Marzocchi and
Woo 2007, Moriarty et al. 2007, Shaluf 2008). The core
components to this evacuation planning can be sum-
marised as: 1) conditions under which an evacuation
may be necessary; 2) ‘at risk’ people/communities who
may require evacuation; 3) evacuation routes and desti-
nations; and 4) the resources and time required to
evacuate ‘at risk’ people/communities (MCDEM, 2008).
Identifying when an evacuation is necessary
Evacuation can be classified as an “organised, phased,
and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civil-
ians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and
includes their reception and care in safe areas” (U.S.
Department of Transportation 2006, p.2-1). Evacuation
becomes necessary when the benefits of leaving signi-
ficantly outweigh the risk of other options, such as
‘sheltering-in-place’. In a volcanic context, evacuation is
a response strategy – an effort to preserve human life
(Marzocchi and Woo 2007, Auckland CDEM 2013). In
order to assist with evacuations, plans are created in
advance, identifying key personnel, areas at risk, and
mitigation measures to enact (Moriarty et al. 2007). In
New Zealand, the Mass Evacuation Plan (MCDEM
2008) is the key sub-national level plan which aims to
detail a range of considerations and actions for the mass
evacuation of people from a hazardous environment to a
relative place of safety (Auckland CDEM Group 2008b).
The Auckland Volcanic Field Contingency Plan is more
specific and includes planning arrangements for evacua-
tions resulting from an eruption within the AVF (Auck-
land CDEM 2013). According to the plan, an evacuation
will be called by the Auckland CDEM Group if hazard
assessment indicates urban or strategic areas may lie
within 5 kilometres of the inferred eruption centre and/
or there is a potential risk to life.
‘At risk’ people and communities
There is varied focus in the literature about which group
or groups tend to be the most ‘at risk’. Low-income pop-
ulations are studied in detail by some (e.g. Morrow
1999, Chakraborty et al. 2005), while others (e.g. Bas-
cetta 2006, Dosa et al. 2007) focus on the elderly and
disabled. The low-mobility population (i.e. those without
access to a private vehicle), however, are discussed by
many and we examine this group further as they will re-
quire public modes of transport (Leonard 1985, Hushon
et al. 1989, Wolshon et al. 2001). Ideally, people within
an evacuation zone evacuate and people resident outside
the zone shelter in place. However, evacuations are typ-
ically far more complex, with some choosing to remain
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voluntarily evacuating (termed shadow evacuation, Baker
1991).
Uncertainty as to who will stay and go (the population
evacuation demand) makes it difficult to establish cred-
ible time estimates for those evacuating, although this is
fundamental for evacuation planning. The population
evacuation demand is dependent on numerous variables
including external conditions such as weather, location
of the hazard source and time, as well as human behav-
ioural characteristics inherent in the population (Wol-
shon 2006, Tomsen 2010). Research on evacuation
response rates for hurricane-based evacuations in the
United States found that evacuation rates ranged be-
tween 33-97% during the same hurricane, with an aver-
age of 47.5% (Baker 1991). People in high-risk areas, on
average, were found to be more than twice as likely to
evacuate when compared to low-risk areas. This was at-
tributed to two factors: people residing in high-risk areas
are aware of the hazardousness of their location and/or
public officials go to greater lengths to evacuate the resi-
dents of these areas (Baker 1991). Less data is available
for non-compliance to shelter-in-place orders, a factor
that often causes emergency management officials the
most difficulty. Two recent surveys regarding such un-
official evacuees reported nearly 60% of respondents
leaving before evacuation orders were given during Hur-
ricanes Lili and Katrina (Lindell et al. 2005, Lindell and
Prater 2006).
Evacuation routes and destinations
Evacuation route choice is a complex decision-making
process. Some researchers believe that in emergency sit-
uations, evacuees will take any possible egress route
(Moriarty et al. 2007). However, others contend that
people will take the most familiar routes (predominantly
motorways), which often become overloaded while cap-
acity on alternative routes remains unused (Prater et al.
2000, Dow and Cutter 2002). During Hurricane Katrina,
drivers were more influenced by familiarity with the
route than traffic conditions they experienced en route
(Lindell and Prater 2006). As stated in the Mass Evacu-
ation Plan for New Zealand (MCDEM 2008, p.56), “the
planning process should decide upon primary and sec-
ondary evacuation routes from an anticipated affected
area”, and “evacuation routes should be designed with
due consideration to local area hazard maps to ensure
that selected routes are appropriate for anticipated haz-
ards”. Any potential bottlenecks in traffic movement
should also be identified (MCDEM 2008). Many studies
in the U.S. have shown that, despite the enormous de-
mand during hurricane evacuations, many roads carry
flows well below the predicted maximums (Wolshon
2008). However, contraflow systems are frequently usedfor evacuations in the U.S. and plans are often well engi-
neered and publicised (Wolshon 2002). Indeed, although
studies on hurricane-based evacuations provide valuable
information, many differences in characteristics such as
risk perception, familiarity and cultural geography, mean
that the results cannot be easily extrapolated to other
hazards or locations (Marrero et al. 2010). Transporta-
tion modelling can be used to help with specific plan-
ning objectives, and allow the testing of various
assumptions and alternatives.
During evacuations people tend to favour temporary
re-location in second homes, hotel/motel accommoda-
tion or with family and friends, rather than seeking
public shelter (Quarantelli 1985). However, in a mass
evacuation, many of the low mobility population and
those without social networks or financial resources will
require assistance with accommodation from emergency
management authorities. For smaller events, ‘all-in-one
welfare facilities’ may be all that are required to service
evacuees. However, when the volume of evacuees is
likely to be large, separate evacuation and recovery cen-
tres may need to be established (MCDEM 2008).
Evacuation resources and time
The ability of a community to respond to a disaster and
cope with its consequences largely depends on its level
of preparedness. However, the impact on an evacuated
community is reduced when evacuation is carried out in
a well-managed and organised manner. During a mass
evacuation, transportation networks are the most critical
components of a region’s infrastructure network, as they
facilitate the mobility of the human population. In devel-
oped countries, private vehicles have often been the pre-
dominant form of mass evacuation (Quarantelli 1980,
Drabek 1986, Lindell and Perry 1992, Tierney et al.
2001, Cole and Blumenthal 2004). This is likely due to
their prominence in today’s society, the flexibility of
route and destination choice they allow, as well as their
asset value, which many evacuees seek to retain. A sur-
vey conducted in 2008 by the New Zealand Ministry of
Civil Defence and Emergency Management with regard
to evacuation behaviour in Auckland, confirmed this
tendency. Of the 2,050 people in the survey, 91.3%
would choose to leave with their own vehicle if required
to evacuate due to an AVF eruption (Horrocks 2008b).
Alternative forms of transportation such as trains and
buses can also be used for evacuation purposes and are
particularly beneficial to the low mobility population
who may strongly rely on their provision.
When considering the time and resources required for
evacuation, it is important to acknowledge the regular
diurnal population shift which occurs in most developed
countries when people travel to places of work and
learning during the day and return home again at night.
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(2001) across the U.S. demonstrated that while more
than 90% of people are at home and indoors between
the hours of 11 pm and 5 am, less than 35% are there
from 10 am to 3 pm. We expect similar trends to occur
in New Zealand, particularly in city environments, al-
though there is little data for comparison at present. In
addition to the standard diurnal shift, other spatio-
temporal movement patterns exist in urban areas. On
weekends and during school holidays, when many resi-
dents leave for recreational activities and travel, the
population in the urban area sinks compared to its
weekday highs. At other times, such as during major
concerts, sporting events and conventions, the urban
population may grow substantially. When evacuation
time estimates are available, emergency management of-
ficials can determine how far in advance evacuation or-
ders should be issued. This allows authorities to balance
the competing demands of enduring public safety and
unnecessary costs associated with imprecise or unneces-
sary evacuations, i.e. false alarms. Because running
evacuation drills is difficult due to the large areas and
populations involved, computer simulations based on
various traffic analysis models offer the next best option
(Franzese and Liu 2008). Current emergency manage-
ment planning in Auckland assumes that a major evacu-
ation (such as for an impending volcanic eruption)
would require 48 hours for authorities to implement
(this includes a pre-evacuation-call planning period).
This was illustrated in the lead up to the simulated
evacuation during a major 2008 exercise based on an
Auckland Volcanic Field eruption, Exercise Ruaumoko,
when civil authorities wanted to know when the
48 hour ‘time window’ before outbreak had been entered
(Lindsay et al. 2010).
The Auckland Volcanic Field
When considering evacuation planning for a volcanic
field eruption the following factors related to the hazard
must be considered: the likelihood; the number of vents
expected; the location(s) of the new vent; the area im-
pacted by volcanic hazards (hazard footprint), which is
dependent on the style and size of eruptive activity pro-
duced during vent opening; and how much warning will
be provided by volcano monitoring systems. The two
most important factors are the hazard footprint and the
location of the eruption, which together allow determin-
ation of the necessary spatial extent of the evacuation
zone. This section reviews the past known eruptive his-
tory of the AVF with particular focus on these two
factors.
The AVF (Figure 1) is a geologically young, generally
monogenetic, intraplate volcanic field made up of over
50 small basaltic volcanoes, which has been active for250,000 years with the last eruption ~550 years ago
(Lindsay et al. 2010, Needham et al. 2011, Shane et al.
2013). Being generally monogenetic in nature, each vent
is typically only active for a single eruption sequence
and new eruptions usually occur in a different location
from those before. To date there have been no spatio-
temporal trends identified for vents in the AVF. Recent
algorithmic analysis by Bebbington and Cronin (2011)
has discounted earlier studies that suggested spatio-
temporal clustering in the AVF. Instead the spatial and
temporal aspects appear independent; hence the location
of the last eruption provides no information about the
next location.
Previous AVF eruptions have typically been small in
volume (<0.1 km3, Allen and Smith 1994), However the
last two eruptions, Rangitoto (2 km3) and Mt.
Wellington (0.17 km3) are two of the largest in volume,
suggesting a possible change in future eruptive behav-
iour (Lindsay 2010).
The eruption style during vent opening is typically
phreatomagmatic, due to rising magma interacting with
groundwater and/or seawater (if a vent occurs in the
ocean). Some eruptions cease after this stage, leaving
broad maars or explosion craters typically 1-2 kilometres
in diameter. Where the eruptions continue beyond this
stage, subsequent activity is of magmatic Hawaiian style,
which produces scoria cones and lava flows. The explo-
sive phreatomagmatic AVF eruptions have generated
volcanic hazards such as base surges, a type of pyroclas-
tic density current (denser-than-air flows which can
travel at 200-300 km h-1 and be >200 °C; Browne 1958,
Belousov et al. 2007), shock-waves and ballistics (mater-
ial >64 mm erupted from the vent) which are highly de-
structive to areas up to 3 kilometre radius of the vent.
Secondary hazards, such as earthquakes, tephra fall and
gas release, would also be noticed throughout the entire
region. The footprint of these hazards from previous
AVF eruptions and those of other analogous volcanoes
have been used to calculate evacuation zones for future
events. Current contingency and mass evacuation plans
call for areas of 3 kilometres (“Primary Evacuation
Zone”) and 5 kilometres (“Secondary Evacuation Zone”)
radius from the erupting vents to account for base
surges (Beca Carter Hollings and Ferner Ltd. 2002,
Auckland CDEM Group 2008b, Auckland CDEM 2013).
Finally, It is likely that civil authorities and area resi-
dents will only be provided with at most a few weeks
and as little as a few days of warning time prior to an
eruption (Beca Carter Hollings and Ferner Ltd. 2002).
This is based on the expected fast magma ascent rates
(1-10 cm s-1) that basaltic volcanic fields are known to
exhibit (Blake et al. 2006, Sherburn et al. 2007). Early de-
tection of precursory activity is therefore critical. How-
ever, the factors contributing to a decision by emergency
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nificant levels of uncertainty to mass evacuation plan-
ning in Auckland. Furthermore, the exact vent area
is likely to be unknown until shortly before outbreak
(Blake et al. 2006). One attempt to address this uncer-
tainty was presented by Sandri et al. (2012), who
developed a cost-benefit analysis model for evacuation
planning by weighing the cost of issuing evacuation
warnings for geographic areas (represented by lost work
potential, warning costs, movement costs etc.) against
the benefit of evacuating (represented by the number of
lives saved). When the benefits of evacuating a certain
area exceed the associated costs, an evacuation is
deemed warranted. The point of changeover is the ideal
boundary to use as the time to call for evacuation. San-
dri et al. (2012) calculated probability threshold values
for a range of magnitudes: small effusive, moderate phre-
atomagmatic and large phreatomagmatic eruptions.
Evacuation radii for these three scenarios were estab-
lished at 3.5, 5 and 8 kilometres respectively. These are
somewhat consistent with the primary (3 km radius) and
secondary (5 km radius) evacuation zones in the AVF
contingency plan, but crucially suggest an additional lar-
ger radius of 8 km should be considered in evacuation
demand analysis. The evacuation area was also found to
change in size with time in the lead-in period, due to a
reduction in the uncertainty in the vent location and in-
crease in the probability of an eruption. Thus, there is a
trade-off between these two factors (area and time) that
dictates which cells must be evacuated, and when (San-
dri et al. 2012). Given the uncertainty in vent location
(and the subsequent need to wait until close to outbreak
to define the evacuation area) it is likely that the evacu-
ation will need to be carried out quickly, i.e. within the
48-hour evacuation time required by civil authorities.
Data sources
Two primary types of data are used in this study: popu-
lation data and infrastructure data. Population data from
Statistics New Zealand, which provides data in its Cen-
sus of Population and Dwellings, was sourced from the
results of the 2006 census. Census areas are arranged
hierarchically with regions representing the most exten-
sive geographical areas, and meshblocks representing
the smallest areas. The more detailed meshblock
scale is used for determining evacuation demand in this
research. We also use neighbourhood areas; defined
here as areas bounded by major and arterial roads, mo-
torways, or saltwater inlets. Census data utilised in the
research includes night-time population, average house-
hold sizes, ages, income levels, vehicle availability per
household, and business demography. Data regarding
school attendance was obtained from the Ministry of
Education. The majority of infrastructure data employedwas provided by the former Auckland Regional Council
and were current as of October 2009. This included geo-
spatial road data files, which contained comprehensive
attributes for the Auckland region such as road hier-
archy, designated speed limits and directionality. In
order to facilitate macro-evacuation studies covering
areas outside Auckland, major and arterial road and
motorway data for Northland and Waikato, produced by
NZ Open GPS Maps (2009), was added to the database.
Since our study a new Census has been carried out in
New Zealand, and we note that it would be worthwhile
repeating this study with post-2009 infrastructure data
together with the new (2013) Census data once it be-
comes available.
Methods
Constraining the study area
Various size estimates have been employed to represent
the size of the AVF. For this study we adopt the same
bounding limits used by Lindsay et al. (2010), reflecting
the continuity of the underlying geology and recognising
the possibility of eruptions taking place outside the
current extent of the AVF. However, we employ an el-
lipse rather than a rectangular area since established vol-
canic fields are more often ovular in shape (Spörli and
Eastwood 1997). The resulting ellipsoid (Figure 2) repre-
sents the large conservative ‘future geologic extent’ of
the AVF and is used as the theoretical boundary of the
field in this study. Subsequent to our study, further work
by Le Corvec et al. (2013a,b) has provided new insights
into a smaller quantitative boundary for the AVF. Were
such a smaller, less-conservative ellipsoid representing
the current extent of the AVF used, all of our calculated
probabilities would be much larger, as the total area
(much of which is water) is reduced. Also, the chance of
zero evacuation demand would likely be minimal, par-
ticularly if evacuations resulting from tsunami generated
by offshore eruptions were incorporated into the study.
Population evacuation demand
Traditional census data in New Zealand reports the
population according to their night-time residence but
does not cover daytime population figures. Business
demographics data from Statistics New Zealand (2008)
and school enrolment data for 2009 provided by the
Ministry of Education were thus used to estimate Auck-
land’s daytime population. Using employing units with a
Goods and Services Tax turnover of $30,000 or more,
there were 593,276 people employed in Auckland and
601,638 people employed from Auckland, suggesting that
roughly 1.4% of Aucklanders leave the region for work.
The number of students enrolled in Auckland schools
was 244,449. As the Ministry of Education do not code
their data to show where students reside, a proxy value
Figure 2 Geometry of the Auckland Volcanic Field. The ellipsoid represents the possible future geologic extent of the AVF and is used in this
study as the presumed theoretical boundary of the field.
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(sum of age 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 cohorts). However, as
not all people in this range attend school, the proxy
value (281,460) overestimates the enrolment generation
by 15%. Equation 1, which was used to generate daytime
population, used the night-time population as a baseline
measure and added the inflows of workers and students,
then subtracted their outflows:
Day pop: ¼ Census night pop: þ workers in
þ school in–workers out–school out ð1Þ
Using the night-time and daytime statistics together al-
lows the magnitude of diurnal movement of Auckland’s
populations to be calculated. However, although diurnal
trends in population are thoroughly assessed in this
study, these are largely based on scenarios for a typical
weekday. Further work to obtain detailed estimates of
population distribution over space and time would
greatly assist evacuation planning in Auckland.
To calculate population evacuation demand, we as-
sumed that all evacuees in the danger areas would
evacuate, and that there is no shadow evacuation outside
of those areas. While these assumptions are simplistic
and unlikely to represent the true human dynamics of a
mass evacuation, they allow for the creation of baseline
values. We also assumed an equal probability distribu-
tion of a new vent forming anywhere in the AVF and
calculated population evacuation demand (at 100-metre
resolution) during day and night for every point in the
AVF. This was accomplished first by determining the
population density of each census meshblock and trans-
forming the densities into aerial-based population values
in ArcGIS (2009). Then, the AVF extent ellipsoid was
buffered by the evacuation radius values. This was done
to reflect the reality that eruptions occurring on the edge
of the AVF will impact those within the evacuation ra-
dius even if they are outside the AVF boundary. In the
final step of the process, the population evacuation de-
mand was calculated for each 100 m2 cell by summing
the values of the individual cells within designated
neighbourhood distances. The three evacuation radii
proposed by Sandri et al. (2012), 3.5, 5 and 8 kilometres,
were used as the neighbourhood distances in successive
calculations, thus producing three models. Each model
was clipped to match the extent of the AVF study area
and contour lines were created at intervals of 50,000
people to enable improved visualisation of the data. The
cells were also reclassified into 50,000 unit intervals,
allowing the results to be displayed numerically as 11
classes. For ease of comparison, we focus our results on
the 5 kilometre evacuation radii, which is also the larger
of the ‘most probable’ evacuation radii used in the
current AVF contingency plan.In addition to total number of evacuees, the low-
mobility population evacuation demand is also of con-
cern for public authorities, particularly as they may rely
on public transportation. Both census and school enrol-
ment data were used to determine the spatial and nu-
meric extent of the population without a vehicle for
each meshblock using Equations 2 and 3 for night and
day respectively.
Low mobility pop: nightð Þ ¼ no motor vehicle households
average household size ð2Þ
Low mobility pop: dayð Þ ¼ð#motor vehicle households
 av:household sizeÞ
þ school enrolment
ð3Þ
It was assumed that no school children drive to school.
Therefore, all school children are considered low-
mobility during the day, but not at night when they
return home to their families. Population evacuation
demand figures for the low-mobility population were
calculated using a similar technique as for the general
population, the major alteration being that low-mobility
meshblock statistics, rather than total meshblock statis-
tics, were adopted as the inputs. The statistical results
were reclassified into 12 classes at 10,000 unit intervals.
Network analysis
Two types of network analysis were conducted in this
study: Spatial analysis to determine the geographic func-
tionality of different transport hubs and evacuation des-
tinations; and vulnerability analysis for the four major
motorway bridges which are integral to Auckland’s
transportation network. ArcGIS (2009) was employed,
with constraining values such as movement restrictions
and distances adopted to calculate populations that res-
ide within easy reach of different transportation assets.
Such assets included public transport stops (bus stations,
ferry terminals and train stations), boat ramps, marinas
and welfare facilities. It should be noted that public
transportation in Auckland is more limited at certain
times such as at night and at weekends, and that the
functionality of such transport depends on the reliability
of its workers and their ability and willingness to travel
to work, no matter what the timing.
All roads and footpaths in Auckland were used to cre-
ate the network dataset and the daytime and night-time
populations for meshblocks within transport service
areas were summed. We chose 30 minutes as the max-
imum time that evacuees would be willing to walk to a
departure point and, based on a consistent walking rate
of 5 km h-1, a time interval representing accessibility
was set correspondingly. As most boat owners access
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bility time interval of 15 minutes, based on average rush
hour speeds for different road types (Auckland Regional
Council 2009b) for this asset type.
The four primary motorway bridges that form essential
links in Auckland’s transportation network are the Auck-
land Harbour Bridge and Northwest Motorway Bridge at
the north end of the isthmus, and the Southern Motor-
way Bridge and Mangere Bridge at the south end (Fig-
ure 1). For the purpose of this study, the vulnerability of
these bridges was based on the likelihood of the struc-
tures lying within each of the designated evacuation
radii. Geospatial buffers were created for each bridge to
match the extent of the three evacuation radii and these
were subsequently clipped to the extent of the AVF. The
resulting areas were then divided by the total area of the
AVF. This provided the probability that any bridge
would intersect the evacuation zone and thus would
likely be damaged or made unusable by the eruption.
The directional vulnerability (i.e. that either bridge in
one direction would be impacted) and combined vulner-
ability of any of the four bridges being impacted was also
assessed. We achieved this by merging and intersecting
the existing bridge-evacuation radii areas with one an-
other in ArcGIS (2009) and dividing the new areas by
the total area of the AVF.
Evacuation vulnerability
Evacuation vulnerability was analysed at both the micro-
and macro-scale. In order to assess evacuation difficulty
at the micro-scale, we employed a method using popula-
tion to exit capacity (P/EC) ratios, first pioneered by
Cova and Church (1997). Neighbourhoods, which are
commonly used for transportation modelling, were used
as a key unit of analysis for this study. This was deemed
appropriate, as evacuation zones need to be easily differ-
entiated by the public and neighbourhood boundaries (i.
e. major and arterial roads, motorways and saltwater in-
lets) are easily distinguishable by eye. Although there is
no mention of boundary delineation in the current mass
evacuation plan for Auckland, clear geographic and
functional features were used to determine evacuation
zones during Exercise Ruaumoko (see Lindsay et al.
2010). Therefore we used saltwater inlets, motorways,
and major and arterial roads to define the neighbour-
hoods and thus evacuation zone boundaries in this
study. This ensures that the majority of traffic will flow
towards the periphery of the neighbourhood from the
onset of evacuation, rather than to a point within the
zone, and then outwards. After determining the neigh-
bourhood zones, the points where each road intersected
the neighbourhood boundary were designated as exits.
Exits were coded according to the neighbourhood they
serviced and their capacity, and half of all one-waystreets were removed, as the direction of flow for these
was indiscernible. The total exit capacity for each neigh-
bourhood was generated and daytime and night-time
populations were calculated based on the neighbour-
hood areas. Dividing the populations by the total exit
capacities thus produced the P/EC ratios.
To statistically test correlations between P/EC ratios
and neighbourhoods with different constricting bound-
ary types (i.e. motorways and water), we employed a
two-tailed t-test with a 95% confidence interval. The null
hypothesis stated that there was statistically no differ-
ence between the mean of the first data set (μ1) and the
second data set (μ2). The alternative hypothesis claimed
that the difference is statistically significant. Four t-tests
were performed. The first three assessed each of the two
constricting boundary types individually and in combin-
ation against the neighbourhoods with neither boundary
type. The final assessment compared neighbourhoods
with neither boundary type against all data values in
aggregate.
As most evacuees in developed countries prefer to
evacuate by private vehicle, we assumed that each
household leaves in one vehicle, and, following the same
procedure used to calculate P/EC ratios, household to
exit capacity (HH/EC) ratios were calculated. Sensitivity
analysis on this assumption was also conducted by as-
suming that all available vehicles per household are used
during evacuation. This was achieved first by using
Equation 4, followed by the same method that was used
to calculate P/EC ratios, thus determining Car/EC ratios.
Cars ¼ nHH one carð Þ  1þ nHH two carsð Þ  2
þ nHH three or more carsð Þ  3 ð4Þ
where nHH represents the number of households in each
census meshblock.
Equation 4 slightly underestimates the number of cars
per meshblock, because it is based on the assumption
that no household has more than three cars, which some
likely do, though data that would resolve this is unavail-
able at present.
TransCAD models were built to assess the feasibility
of overland movements along the regional roadway net-
work in Auckland and to test various independent vari-
ables on a macro-scale to determine the degree to which
they impact the network clearance time (TransCAD, de-
veloped by Caliper Corporation, is a GIS with highly
specialised transportation modelling capabilities). Such
models dissect the transportation network as a set of
links (roads) and nodes (intersections or endpoints).
Centroids are a special set of nodes representing the
geographic centre of a Traffic Analysis Zone (TAZ).
Centroids begin and end every modelled trip and
therefore represent both origin (neighbourhood) and
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nected by the Auckland road network, which is general-
ised to improve processing. A generalised road network
also has the advantage of more realistically modelling
evacuation flows because the public’s knowledge of the
road network will be imperfect and they are most likely
to remain on more familiar routes such as major roads
and motorways (Tomsen 2010).
Designated Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency
Management welfare facilities were chosen as the destin-
ation locations for intra-regional evacuation studies on
the macro-scale. This is because, in an ideal situation, all
evacuees would go to such a facility to register with
emergency management officials before heading to their
final destination. For inter-regional analysis, two major
welfare facilities outside the Auckland region, one in
Hamilton (south) and the other in Whangarei (north)
were chosen as the destination locations (Figure 1). For
the purpose of this study, the road network outside of
the Auckland region was generalised in two ways: mo-
torways only, and motorways in combination with major
arterial roads. However, within the Auckland region, all
major and arterial roads were utilised, forming the intri-
cate lattice of TAZ boundaries. In macro-evacuation
models, TAZs do not contain intra-zonal roads; there-
fore, secondary roads in Auckland were removed by def-
inition. Vehicle capacity values were assigned to each
road type in the models. As capacity values were not
available for Auckland, estimates provided in the Bris-
bane Strategic Transport Model (Brisbane City Council
2007) were adopted. These values range from 1,100 vehi-
cles per lane per hour for arterial roads to 2,100 vehicles
per lane per hour for 4-lane motorways. The number of
centroid connectors determines the number of neigh-
bourhood exits that are utilised. While this has no im-
pact on intra-zonal movement, the effects of congestion
begin as soon as the first non-centroid node is reached.
To determine the effect of this congestion, the number
of centroid connectors was varied as a form of sensitivity
analysis. Other forms of sensitivity analysis included
modification for time of day, evacuation radii, vent loca-
tions, welfare facility locations, shadow evacuations and
various levels of road network detail.
TransCAD models were run for AVF vent locations
with minimum and maximum population evacuation de-
mand values using the 5 kilometre evacuation radius
(determined from results of the micro-vulnerability
work). Since there were multiple locations with no
evacuation demand, vent locations furthest from the
coast in both Waitemata and Manukau Harbours were
selected as the minima. The maximum population
evacuation demand value was generated from a vent lo-
cation one kilometre south of Mount Eden. Additionally,
the vent used for Exercise Ruaumoko, 0.7 kilometreswest of Mangere Bridge in the Manukau Harbour (see
Lindsay et al. 2010), was also selected as a scenario.
Outputs from TransCAD models include total flows
over the entire network, Volume-Over-Capacity (VOC)
ratios and total network clearance times. Flows indicate
the total volume of traffic passing over each network
link, which in turn provides data on which links are
most heavily used and thus the most critical during
evacuations. Total flows over the entire network
equalled the total number of vehicles involved in the
evacuation. Flows alone, though useful in visualising
movement, cannot predict congestion, because they
do not account for the capacity of the road segments.
VOC ratios excel at this and are a common measure of
assessing movement difficulty (Cova and Church 1997,
Church and Cova 2000, Shulman 2008, Marrero et al.
2010). VOC ratios examine the volume of traffic on each
lane of the road divided by the lane’s capacity (similar to
Car/EC ratios, except VOC ratios are based on links ra-
ther than zones). High ratios are indicative of conges-
tion and when the VOC approaches 1, the velocity
of traffic approaches 0. The clearance time (i.e. the
time required to evacuate Auckland) was calculated
for different inter- and intra-regional evacuation sce-
narios by linking the network travel times to the ori-
ginal road network.
TransCAD models, like all other evacuation models,
rely on the accuracy of the data they employ and the
underlying assumptions within the models. While the
baseline datasets of population and road infrastructure
are accurate, the derivative datasets used to produce
origin-to-destination functions are highly dependent on
the validity of numerous assumptions. Some assump-
tions, including evacuation compliance, shadow evacu-
ation and vehicle use rates can be measured indirectly
through questionnaires and tested in models with sensi-
tivity analysis; others, such as the destination of evac-
uees, can only be presumed and aggregated. Further
assumptions are built into the model and cannot be al-
tered. For instance, TransCAD models rely on a constant
road network and consistent driver interaction. This ig-
nores the possibility of traffic accidents, network alter-
ations due to ongoing damage, and the possibility of
panic or “road rage” on the part of drivers. A further
limitation with TransCAD is its click-and-run start-up
method, which prevents evacuees from being added to
the model at successive time intervals. Essentially, the
number of evacuees the model begins with is how many
it processes to completion. No variation in preparation
time is accounted for. Models are also limited to egress
population movements, disregarding background traffic.
Background traffic is a legitimate concern if little fore-
warning is provided (Urbanik 2000); yet, when sufficient
forewarning is provided (as is expected with an AVF
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cant issues (Lindell and Prater 2007).Results
Population evacuation demand
The total night-time population of Auckland, based on
the raw census data (2006) was 1,264,011. The daytime
population based on typical worker and student migra-
tion was calculated to be 1,218,638. Thus, a loss of 3.6%
of the population is noted in the statistics and used as
the basis of further analysis for this study. Geographic
analysis of diurnal movement in Auckland showed that
areas of greatest population gain during the day were
business areas, whereas areas of greatest population loss
were residential areas. The Central Business District
(CBD) had nearly three times the population influx of
any of Auckland’s other 238 neighbourhoods and thus is
likely to be much more difficult to evacuate during the
day than night.
The numeric results of the population evacuation de-
mand model outputs are presented in Table 1. Two out-
puts of this model, utilising the 5 kilometre evacuation
radii and the two time variables, are shown in Figure 3.
The percentage values reflect the proportion of the cells
in the AVF that fall into each category. Because this
study employs an equal probability distribution of an
eruption occurring at any location in the AVF, the per-
centage values also represent the likelihood that a future
AVF eruption will generate the number of evacuees
listed in each class. For instance, using a 5 kilometre
evacuation radius, there is a 56.4% chance that 1-50,000
evacuees will result from a daytime eruption.Table 1 Population evacuation demand statistics
Evacuation
Demand
Day Night
3.5 km 5 km 8 km 3.5 km 5 km 8 km
0 11.8% 3.9% 0.0% 11.7% 3.9% 0.0%
1 – 50,000 65.5% 56.4% 37.3% 62.3% 50.8% 32.4%
50,000–100,000 18.7% 18.0% 13.0% 23.6% 20.9% 13.7%
100,000-150,000 2.1% 11.2% 12.1% 2.3% 19.5% 11.7%
150,000-200,000 1.2% 5.7% 10.4% 0.0% 3.8% 13.4%
200,000-250,000 0.8% 2.5% 5.9% 0.0% 1.1% 9.7%
250,000-300,000 0.0% 1.7% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2%
300,000-350,000 0.0% 0.6% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 5.8%
350,000-400,000 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 6.0%
400,000-450,000 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
450,000-500,000 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average 27,210 55,077 137,317 27,088 55,346 134,268
Minimum 0 0 6 0 0 6
Maximum 237,405 327,937 505,677 131,841 239,895 397,549Larger evacuation radii were found to substantially in-
crease the average and maximum population evacuation
demands and diminish the initial spike in evacuation de-
mands present for smaller radii. During daytime, evacu-
ation demand values are high around the CBD area but
become more widely dispersed as the radius increases or
during night-time. Correspondingly, the maximum
evacuation demand values are substantially smaller for
night-time than daytime evacuations (the average max-
imum daytime value is 357,000 using all three radii,
while the average maximum night-time value is
256,000). The results show that there are some locations
in the AVF that would generate no evacuation demand,
because the vents are located sufficiently far offshore
(reflected as zero values in Table 1). Using the 3.5 kilo-
metre radius, there is a 12% chance that an eruption will
generate no evacuees. Using the 5 kilometre radius, this
figure is reduced to 4%, and with an 8 kilometre radius
to 0%, though the minimum values remain quite low.
However, it should be noted that we do not consider
evacuation need due to tsunami generated by offshore
volcanic eruptions in our study. Such an event may re-
sult in increased evacuation demand in coastal areas.
Low-mobility population evacuation demand
Based on school enrolment figures and households with
no vehicles, there are 321,162 people with low-mobility
in Auckland during the day and 76,713 people at night.
This represents 25.4% and 6.1% of Auckland’s total
population, respectively. These calculations may over-
estimate the daytime low-mobility population, since low-
mobility groups increasingly use social networks to ob-
tain rides with friends or neighbours rather than relying
on public transportation (Lindell and Prater 2007). Add-
itionally, an unknown percentage of school children
come from low-mobility households and thus would be
double-counted during the day, and some parents may
pick up children from school during an evacuation. A
proportion of older students may also drive to school,
although we expect that this is more prevalent in rural
communities than urban centres such as Auckland. All
of these variables however, are somewhat counterba-
lanced by an underestimation of the number of house-
holds with no access to motor vehicles, which result
from the meshblock level census data for car ownership
providing no data for some areas (due to small sample
sizes being deemed confidential by Statistics New Zea-
land). Also, other low-mobility groups such as the hospi-
talised and institutionalised are omitted from the
calculations. The former Auckland Regional Council cal-
culated that 7.4% of Aucklanders have no access to a
motor vehicle - a figure comparative to the 6.1% value
used in this study, justified as the council’s calculations
are based on a regional rather than meshblock scale
Figure 3 Daytime (A) and night-time (B) population evacuation demand for a 5 kilometre evacuation radius. Note the different scales
used for the daytime and night-time evacuation demand colour-ramps.
Table 2 Low-mobility population evacuation demand
statistics
Evacuation
Demand
Day Night
3.5 km 5 km 8 km 3.5 km 5 km 8 km
0 20.6% 11.8% 4.0% 21.0% 11.8% 4.0%
1-10,000 47.7% 40.2% 26.9% 78.7% 77.7% 59.3%
10,000-20,000 22.5% 15.0% 10.9% 0.4% 10.5% 22.9%
20,000-30,000 7.3% 14.1% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 13.5%
30,000-40,000 1.9% 12.7% 9.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
40,000-50,000 0.0% 4.5% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
50,000-60,000 0.0% 1.3% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
60,000-70,000 0.0% 0.5% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
70,000-80,000 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
80,000-90,000 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
90,000-100,000 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
100,000-110,000 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average 6,945 13,993 34,672 1,722 3,473 8,652
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 39,283 66,629 108,455 11,375 19,073 31,610
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sults for the low-mobility population evacuation demand
are presented in Table 2 and two outputs of the geo-
graphic model utilising the 5 kilometre evacuation radii
and two time variables, are shown in Figure 4, overlaid
atop the ferry and rail station stops.
Network analysis
Geospatial network analysis showed that the bus net-
work, with a high number of stops and wide geographic
distribution, was accessible to the majority of the Auck-
land population. Based on a standardised walking rate of
5 km h-1, over 92% of Aucklanders can reach a bus stop
within a 30 minute walk regardless of the time of day.
Other networks such as trains and ferries, were signifi-
cantly less accessible; The number of Aucklanders who
can reach train stations or ferry terminals within a 30 mi-
nute walk were 37% (night-time) to 47% (daytime) and
those who can reach ferry terminals in the same time
were 5% (night-time) to 12% (daytime). The percentage
of people living within a 15-minute drive, based on typ-
ical rush hour traffic speeds (Auckland Regional Council
Figure 4 Daytime (A) and night-time (B) low-mobility population evacuation demand for a 5 kilometre evacuation radius. Note the
different scales used for the daytime and night-time evacuation demand colour-ramps.
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whereas the percentage within 15 minutes of a boat
ramp is high (90-92%).
Individual vulnerable bridge probability values for the
three evacuation radii range from 3.1% to 14.7%. Com-
bined bridge vulnerability statistics are listed in Table 3.
The maximum probability of either one of the north or
south bridges being impacted nearly doubles as the ra-
dius is increased. For the 5 kilometre evacuation radius,
there is a 1.7% chance that both north bridges, and a
1.5% chance that both south bridges, will be impacted
but 0% chance that three bridges will be impacted by theTable 3 Combined bridge vulnerability statistics
Bridges 3.5 km 5 km 8 km
Any 12.7% 21.5% 38.7%
Either North 7.3% 11.9% 21.8%
Either South 5.4% 9.6% 20.6%
Both North 0.2% 1.7% 7.7%
Both South 0.2% 1.5% 7.3%
NW, Harbour & Mangere 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%eruption (Figure 5). In the event of an 8 kilometre evacu-
ation radius however, there is a 1.7% chance that three
bridges could be simultaneously impacted. It should be
stressed that if the overall size of the AVF were reduced
to include a more restricted (less conservative) ellipse
around the existing volcanic cones (Figure 1), the prob-
ability of each event described above would be dramatic-
ally increased.
Micro-scale evacuation vulnerability
Diurnal changes in population evacuation demand are
reflected in the calculated P/EC ratio values (population/
exit capacity, described above). Although no data exists
for threshold P/EC ratios for different roads in Auck-
land, a comparison of values provides a first-hand rela-
tive assessment of potential congestion areas. There is a
high concentration of areas with elevated P/EC ratios
during the day in and around the CBD, which at night is
dramatically reduced. The reverse is true for many outly-
ing suburbs, particularly those in West Auckland and
the North Shore, which experience much higher ratios
at night. This makes intuitive sense as many people
Figure 5 Directional bridge vulnerability for a 5 kilometre evacuation radius. This shows the probabilities of either bridges and both
bridges to the north or south being impacted by an eruption. Note that if a smaller, less-conservative ellipse representing the extent of the AVF
were used in this study, the probability of each event would be higher.
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Table 4 lists the five neighbourhoods with the highest
and five neighbourhoods with the lowest P/EC ratios.
Two of the five neighbourhoods with the greatest net
population gain during the day, the CBD and Auckland
Airport, also have the two highest P/EC ratios during
the day (1,819 and 1,574 people per exit lane, respect-
ively). Night-time P/EC ratios for many of these neigh-
bourhoods are significantly lower. Neighbourhoods with
the greatest net population losses during the day also
have some of the highest night-time P/EC ratios. Overall,
the highest P/EC ratios during the night are far lower
than the highest P/EC ratios during the day. Only two
neighbourhoods, both in south Auckland, have P/EC ra-
tios over 1,000 at night.
When graphically comparing daytime and night-time
P/EC ratios, the prevalence of neighbourhoods with
lower P/EC ratios is very clear. Based on the Brisbane
Strategic Transport Model (Brisbane City Council 2007)
access roads, such as those connecting neighbourhoods
to primary roads, can facilitate the movement of up to
600 vehicles per hour. Therefore P/EC ratios > 600 are
very likely to cause congestion and the value was used as
a benchmark. In our study, the number of neighbour-
hoods with P/EC values greater than 600 is very small
both at day and night (Figure 6).
Geographic features are of great consequence when
assessing P/EC ratios. Neighbourhoods with both motor-
way and water boundaries have higher P/EC ratios. This
is to be expected, as boundaries work as constraining
geographic features limiting the number of exits. The re-
sults of statistical analysis of neighbourhood boundaries
are shown in Table 5. All p-values, with two exceptions,
were less than 0.05 and thus statistically significant.
These results show that there is a significant difference
between neighbourhoods with only motorways asTable 4 Neighbourhoods with highest and lowest Population
DAY*
Rank Neighbourhood P/EC Day P/EC Night
1 Puhoi 10.3 28.5
2 Gardens East 11.3 42.9
3 Glenbrook 15.1 34.6
4 Ormiston North 18.9 41.9
5 Greenhithe 23.6 84.2
234 Sylvia Park 1292.4 10.3
235 Rosedale 1362.5 267.0
236 Hingaia 1567.9 685.3
237 Akld Airport 1574.3 89.9
238 Akld CBD 1818.9 447.0
*The highest and lowest ranked P/EC ratios are shown in bold font. These are comp
shown in normal font. For location of neighbourhoods please visit: http://www.statsboundaries and neighbourhoods with neither water nor
motorways as boundaries during the day (i.e. when
people are at work). However, at night there is no statis-
tically significant difference. Contrastingly, neighbour-
hoods with only water boundaries are significantly
different during the night (i.e. when those people return
home), but not during the day. This is likely due to more
residential neighbourhoods being located close to water
features which provide both aesthetic and recreational
value. Neighbourhoods containing businesses are more
likely to occur close to motorway on- and off-ramps,
which enable easy access for workers and goods. There-
fore, when either of these neighbourhood types reach
their peak population, they usually become more diffi-
cult to evacuate.
The numeric results of the HH/EC ratio and Car/EC
ratio calculations are presented in Table 6. Results of
both studies were found to be similar to those of the
night-time P/EC ratios. HH/EC ratios were generally
one third that of the P/EC ratios; this correlates with the
fact that the mean Auckland household has three resi-
dents (Statistics New Zealand 2006). Car/EC ratios were
around half as large as P/EC ratios, which correlates
with there being roughly twice as many people as cars in
Auckland (Statistics New Zealand 2006, New Zealand
Transport Agency 2009). The minima Car/EC ratios at
or bordering zero are suspect and likely due to the fact
that such areas have very low residential populations.
When compared to P/EC ratios and Car/EC ratios, HH/
EC ratios represent the best-case scenario, as they min-
imise the overall number of evacuating units and thus
the ratio, thereby producing fewer units per exit lane.
Macro-scale evacuation vulnerability
For inter- and intra-regional evacuations, flows often
exceeded 50,000 vehicles along motorway sections, but/Evacuation Capacity (P/EC) ratios for day and night
NIGHT*
Rank Neighbourhood P/EC Night P/EC Day
1 Druces West 4.3 710.9
2 Manukau South 6.5 361.3
3 Sylvia Park 10.3 1292.4
4 Hampton Park 10.8 595.1
5 Pukekohe North 16.2 123.9
234 Wattle Farm 778.6 450.0
235 Sunnynook 842.1 376.3
236 Gulf Harbour 886.0 448.3
237 E Howick Beaches 1000.6 653.8
238 Mt. Mangere 1291.4 753.4
ared with the corresponding P/EC ratios for the contrasting diurnal time
.govt.nz/StatsMaps/Home.aspx.
Figure 6 Daytime and night-time Population/Exit Capacity (P/EC) ratios. The P/EC ratios for key neighbourhoods described in the text are
shown on the graph.
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roads. Symbolising flows along different routes by means
of varying line thickness allows these differences in flows
to be visualised (Figure 7).
In scenarios run for Auckland, the maximum VOC ra-
tio for inter-regional evacuation was 92, which was
established for a daytime evacuation with multiple vehi-
cles, based on the maxima vent location and a large
shadow evacuation. This suggests that the volume of
traffic greatly exceeded the lane’s capacity. VOC ratios
were highest along motorways and in inter-regional
evacuation models. In such cases, speeds were reduced
to miniscule fractions of a km h-1, i.e. traffic had come
to a virtual standstill. The maximum VOC ratios for
intra-regional evacuations however, were much lower
(maximum = 6.56), a trend which was also depicted in
the total network travel times (i.e. the cumulative time
for all drivers to reach their final destinations). For the
inter-regional evacuations modelled, clearance time was
found to be in the order of days to years. Intra-regional
evacuation clearance times were found to be much
lower, ranging from one to nine hours. This was regard-
less of the level of network detail or number of connec-
tors employed.Table 5 Statistical t-test comparison of neighbourhood
boundary types
μ1 μ2 p-value (day) p-value (night)
Both Neither 0.020 0.012
Motorway Only Neither 0.020 0.632
Water Only Neither 0.623 0.004
Neither All 0.020 0.034Discussion
Impact of diurnal population shifts on evacuation
demand
Neighbourhoods with large daily population influxes are
likely to be more difficult to evacuate during the day
than at night because a greater demand will be placed
on a static infrastructure network. Neighbourhoods with
net losses will become easier to evacuate during the day
(Tomsen 2010). A key finding of the population evacu-
ation demand results is that demand values are high
around the CBD during the day but become more widely
dispersed at night. This can be attributed to a diurnal
population shift, which is likely due to commuters mov-
ing away from the CBD toward peripheral, residential
areas during the evening.
Night-time evacuation demand figures are significantly
lower for the low-mobility population than the general
population. In terms of geographic distribution, the
North Shore has much less of a low-mobility evacuation
demand as residents living there have greater access to
motor vehicles. The reverse is true for South Auckland,
which, when utilising the smaller two evacuation radii,
nearly rivals the CBD as the peak evacuation demand
centre. Daly et al. (2007) estimated that the maximum
combined capacity of the Auckland public transportation
system for an initial outward movement, assuming all
public resources could be mustered, was just under
50,000 passenger seats. This capacity is more than suffi-
cient for all night-time low-mobility evacuation models
in our study, but not the 5 kilometre and 8 kilometre
daytime low-mobility evacuation models. With a 5 kilo-
metre evacuation radius, there is roughly a 2% chance
this capacity will be exceeded during a daytime evacu-
ation. This probability grows to roughly 35% with an 8
kilometre evacuation radius. Similar issues associated
Table 6 Neighbourhoods with highest and lowest Household/EC Ratios and Car/EC Ratios
Household/Evacuation Capacity (HH/EC)* Car/Evacuation Capacity (Car/EC)*
Rank Neighbourhood HH/EC Car/EC P/EC Night Rank Neighbourhood Car/EC HH/EC P/EC Night
1 Manukau South 0.5 0.7 6.5 1 Druces West 0.0 2.1 4.3
2 Druces West 2.1 0.0 4.3 2 Sylvia Park 0.0 3.2 10.3
3 Sylvia Park 3.2 0.0 10.3 3 Manukau South 0.7 0.5 6.5
4 Hampton Park 4.9 6.2 10.8 4 Pukekohe North 5.5 5.3 16.2
5 Hobsonville 5.2 9.6 16.7 5 Hampton Park 6.2 4.9 10.8
234 West Tamaki 246.4 361.4 771.5 234 Hingaia 454.5 229.0 685.3
235 Sunnynook 280.1 472.9 842.1 235 Sunnynook 472.9 280.1 842.1
236 Gulf Harbour 313.1 540.0 886.0 236 Gulf Harbour 540.0 313.1 886.0
237 E Howick Beaches 328.2 628.1 1000.6 237 E Howick Beaches 628.1 328.2 1000.6
238 Mt. Mangere 411.6 643.2 1291.4 238 Mt. Mangere 643.2 411.6 1291.4
*The highest and lowest ranked Household/EC ratios and Car/EC ratios are shown in bold font. These are compared with the corresponding Car/EC ratios and
Household/EC ratios, and also P/EC ratios, which are shown in normal font. For location of neighbourhoods please
visit: http://www.stats.govt.nz/StatsMaps/Home.aspx.
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encountered worldwide. For example, during Hurricane
Katrina, there were some clear failures, particularly
when it came to evacuating low-mobility groups in New
Orleans (Wolshon 2006).
Bridge vulnerability and importance of maritime
transport
In terms of transportation networks, a worst-case sce-
nario for Auckland is a volcanic eruption impacting both
bridges connecting the isthmus in the same direction; a
1.7% and 1.5% chance for both north and both south
bridges respectively, for a 5 kilometre evacuation radius.
Such an event would virtually sever all motor vehicle
movement into and out of Auckland in that direction.
Values for public transport network accessibility for the
population with no access to a private vehicle were al-
ways greater than night-time values for the entire popu-
lation. This makes intuitive sense, as people without a
vehicle would likely live closer to public transportation
assets to fulfil any day-to-day transportation require-
ments. It should be noted that while motorways and
public transit routes are likely to become jammed, not
helped by the constraining geography in Auckland, the
likelihood of such congestion on the waters of the Wait-
emata and Manukau Harbours is low. Boats, unlike most
cars and buses, are capable of transporting extensive
cargo and are often kept stocked with essential survival
materials including food, water and clothes. Therefore,
although non-traditional, a part-maritime based evacu-
ation may hold several advantages in Auckland. In 2008,
such an evacuation was successfully demonstrated in
Chaitén, Chile where over 5,000 people were evacuated
by boat shortly before the town was inundated by lahars
originating from the nearby volcano (Major and Lara
2013, Wilson et al. 2009). Marinas and ferry terminalsare more limited in numbers than boat ramps in Auck-
land and the accessibility figures reflect this. Boat ramps
however, have the major disadvantage of additional prep-
aration time required as many boat owners would ini-
tially have to return home from work during the day to
collect boats for an evacuation, perhaps via congested
roads. Despite this, the potential for maritime evacuation
by private boats and ferries should not be underesti-
mated in Auckland.
Relative evacuation difficulty as revealed by P/EC ratios
Micro-scale vulnerability analysis using P/EC ratios can
be produced anywhere that population and road net-
work data are available. In this study, such ratios were
found to be effective in determining which areas, due to
their infrastructure design, pose greater difficulties for
evacuation. A comparison of daytime and night-time P/
EC ratios (Figure 6) shows that the number of neigh-
bourhoods with relatively large P/EC ratios is low.
However, these neighbourhoods are of greatest concern
as they will likely be more difficult to evacuate on a
micro-scale. Two of the five neighbourhoods with the
greatest net population gain during the day, the CBD
and Auckland Airport, also have the two highest P/EC
ratios during the day. This indicates that neighbour-
hoods experiencing the largest daytime population influx
are some of the most difficult to evacuate during the day
because of the inflexible infrastructure setup. A similar
trend is observed for neighbourhoods with high night-
time population influx. Neighbourhoods such as Wattle
Farm in South Auckland and Eastern Howick Beaches in
East Auckland (Figure 1), with the greatest net popula-
tion losses during the day, also have some of the highest
night-time P/EC ratios. This is most likely attributed to
the return of school children and workers during even-
ing hours. This suggests that residential neighbourhoods
Figure 7 Symbolised graduated road flows for intra-regional (A) and inter-regional (B) evacuation. The total flows over the entire network
equals the total number of vehicles involved in the evacuation. Along motorway sections, flows often exceed 50,000 vehicles. Flows for other
arterial and major roads rarely exceeded 20,000 vehicles.
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night are also some of the most difficult to evacuate at
night as a result of infrastructure setup. Overall, how-
ever, the highest P/EC ratios during the day are far
higher than the highest P/EC ratios during the night.
This indicates that evacuations in the top-five most chal-
lenging neighbourhoods are much more challenging
during the day than at night. This can be attributed to
the larger number of residential neighbourhoods than
business and industrial neighbourhoods in Auckland.
This reflects a metropolitan standard; in order to sup-
port an urban core, multiple feeder (i.e. residential)
neighbourhoods are required.
Vulnerability trends related to boundary types also
emerged during the study. Significantly higher P/EC ra-
tios were experienced by neighbourhoods with both
water and motorway boundaries than neighbourhoods
with neither. Contrasting P/EC ratios observed for
neighbourhoods with the different boundary types (i.e.
high P/EC ratios for those with motorways and low P/
EC ratios for those with water during the day) are likely
attributable to the neighbourhood type. Business and in-
dustrial neighbourhoods are more likely to be located
near motorways to enable easy access for workers and
goods. Residential neighbourhoods, in contrast, are more
likely to be located close to water features as they pro-
vide aesthetic and recreational value. Motorways offer
neither of these. The minima Car/EC ratios at or border-
ing zero for some neighbourhoods may be due to the
fact that some areas, such as Druces West and Sylvia
Park (both in South Auckland), have virtually no resi-
dential population and are primarily used for business
purposes. Such areas will likely be easy to evacuate at
night but will be difficult to evacuate during business
hours when there are high populations and limited
capacities.
Intra-regional vs. inter-regional evacuation
The preference for Auckland Civil Defence and Emer-
gency Management is to localise evacuations as much as
possible, moving evacuees outside the danger zone (via a
welfare facility for registration purposes) but keeping
them close to home and within the region (MCDEM
2008). There were 151 Civil Defence and Emergency
Management designated welfare facilities at the time of
this study, including schools, churches and sports sta-
diums. More than half of Auckland’s population were
located within 5 minutes driving distance of the near-
est facility and virtually all Aucklanders can access
one within a 15-minute drive. However, the nearest wel-
fare facility will not always be available or suitable for
evacuation purposes (for example it might lie in the
evacuation zone or be impacted by localised critical in-
frastructure disruption). In such cases it will benecessary for evacuees to travel greater distances until
they reach an alternative welfare facility in a safe loca-
tion before heading to their final destination, wherever
that may be. During a large phreatomagmatic eruption,
critical infrastructure across Auckland may be crippled
and an inter-regional evacuation may be necessary. Prior
to this study, the best estimate of an evacuation clear-
ance time for Auckland was developed during Exercise
Ruaumoko in 2008. During this exercise, civil defence
authorities allowed less than 24 hours in order to evacu-
ate a 5 kilometre radius zone (Horrocks 2008a). How-
ever, this clearance time was only postulation and lacked
any scientific backing. Though a conclusive figure will
be unavailable until an actual evacuation is conducted,
the next best solution, deriving scientifically backed esti-
mates by means of evacuation modelling, was under-
taken in this study.
Marco-scale evacuation vulnerability analysis showed
that clearance time for inter-regional evacuation was in
the order of days to years. This indicates that congestion
is not limited to specific links, but rather endemic in the
network due to limited capacities and excessive demand.
Evacuees would most likely walk rather than wait in traf-
fic congestion for such prolonged periods and the cap-
abilities of the TransCAD model can therefore be
deemed somewhat limited for computing movement
times over such large distances especially with heavy
congestion. In essence however, it can be concluded that
the Auckland road network is ill suited for large-scale
egress movements at present. Despite this, one major
trend was identified from the inter-regional modelling:
as more detail is added to the road network, thus allow-
ing evacuees more route choice flexibility, clearance
times are reduced. In the future it would be worthwhile
recalculating macro-scale evacuation vulnerability using
an evacuation modelling program specifically designed
to accommodate high congestion levels, which could
also be used to validate intra-regional evacuation results.
The relatively short clearance times for intra-regional
evacuations mean that there is considerable merit to
intra-regional over inter-regional evacuation from a mo-
bility standpoint. The reasons for lower intra-regional
clearance times are heavily associated with path lengths.
While inter-regional evacuees commonly traversed
roughly 150 kilometres of road network, intra-regional
evacuees seldom travelled further than 10 kilometres.
Network capacity is another contributing factor. VOC
analysis confirmed that motorways would be congested
in all evacuation scenarios, regardless of the amount of
network detail. Yet, intra-regional evacuations are less
dependent on the motorway network than inter-regional
evacuations, as there are more alternate routes due to
dense urban development in the city. It should be noted
that all of the clearance time figures represent the
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Analysis Zone boundary and do not include preparation
times (estimated to be 1 to 2 days in Auckland (Auck-
land CDEM Group 2008b)) or intra-zonal movement
times.
Conclusions
This study has numerically demonstrated a future eruption
in the AVF will almost certainly create considerable eva-
cuation demands, which require considerable planning.
Although the locations of new eruptions are unknown,
adopting a non-specific eruption vent approach has allowed
the impacts at all locations, and population and infrastruc-
ture vulnerability to be modelled and assessed. Our key
conclusions and recommendations are:
 Eruptions in the central Auckland isthmus area are
likely to generate high evacuation demand, peaking
at just over half a million evacuees in places. This is
particularly relevant given that rapid evacuation is
likely to be needed, i.e. within 48 hours. High P/EC
ratios in the same regions indicate that
transportation infrastructure may struggle to cope.
Based on a 5 kilometre evacuation radius, there is
just a 4% chance that an eruption would generate no
evacuation demand.
 Daytime eruptions near Auckland Airport and in
business districts, particularly the CBD, will generate
high population evacuation demand. Daytime
maximum population evacuation demand figures are
around three times higher than night-time eruptions
in these areas due to the large population influx
from residential suburbs during the day. There is
also a substantial low-mobility population in the
central Auckland area during the day, largely attrib-
utable to the number of students. Indeed the pre-
dicted daytime maximum low-mobility evacuation
demand may be more than twice the seating cap-
acity of Auckland’s total public transportation assets
meaning that return trips may be required to ac-
commodate such demand. Large daytime increases
in population evacuation demand combined with
high P/EC ratios may favour an evacuation at night
in some areas (such as the CBD) to avoid severe
congestion (although this needs to be counterba-
lanced by the limited visibility and other constraints
of evacuation by night). Delaying the call to evacuate
until the majority of people are home, or advising
people to remain at home to await an evacuation de-
cision, should be considered. This supports the con-
sideration in the current mass evacuation plan for
Auckland which favours evacuation from home due
to likely reduced preparation time (Auckland CDEM
Group 2008b). The bus network is accessible by foot to nearly the
entire Auckland population but, as with private
transport, is subject to road congestion that
commonly plagues evacuations. There is a moderate
chance (13-39% depending on the eruptive
magnitude) that one of the four motorway bridges
would be impacted and an up to 8% chance that
multiple bridges facilitating evacuation in the same
direction are impacted. Any impacts to bridges will
likely increase congestion and further disrupt
evacuation. Transportation by boat and rail is
significantly less accessible but these modes rarely
experience major congestion in Auckland. For this
reason, the value of maritime evacuation by ferries,
and private boats using boat ramps and marinas,
should not be underestimated. This could be
particularly beneficial in neighbourhoods with high
population/exit capacity that have both water and
motorway boundaries. Maritime evacuation would
play to Auckland’s geographic strength: its double
harbour access, and would likely ease congestion on
available motorways. In addition, the Ports of
Auckland east coast seaport (adjacent to the CBD)
provides an opportunity for people to be evacuated
by a non-traditional mode of maritime transport,
namely cargo vessels.
 Each of the modelled TransCAD scenarios
experienced massive congestion, as thousands of
evacuees flooded a limited number of evacuation
routes. Congestion was not limited to specific links,
but rather endemic in the network due to limited
capacities and excessive demand. Intra-regional, ra-
ther than inter-regional, evacuations were favoured,
reducing total network clearance times by multiple
orders of magnitude (from days to between one and
nine hours). This suggests that evacuation to desti-
nations within the Auckland region should be given
preference over evacuation to destinations outside
the region if possible.
 TransCAD results also suggest that route choice
flexibility will likely reduce the clearance time for
evacuation. Such choices may be critical for inter-
regional evacuations to be completed within man-
ageable timeframes. However for this to work, evac-
uees must either have prior knowledge of the
various network connections or be informed of them
using signage and/or other communication methods.
 The survivability of Auckland’s critical infrastructure
during volcanic activity is an important unknown.
Functional transportation networks are fundamental
for evacuation purposes. Whether infrastructure
assets, including bridges, tunnels, traffic lights, signs
and motorways will be functional following volcanic
activity such as tremors and ash fall determines
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impacts egress movements. Further study is required
in this field.
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